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This thesis is the outgrowth of a combination of trends, 
historic, political and psychological, which have attracted 
the writer's attention not a little since the close of the 
World War. In this gigantic clash Americans were classed as 
crusaders, or Idealists, or imperialists, or even as delin-
quents. In 1897-98 the same terms were employed, but the 
war with Spain ended so quickly, so completely, at such 
small cost in blood and treasure, that to us ordinary 
students it is almost lost in the mazes of history. Yet it 
seems not unfair to say that the forces and emotions which 
prompted the masses to action in 1898 were even more Ideal-
istic than were those which moved the Americans to join 
forces with the Allies in 1917. In 1898 America took upon 
herself the task of freeing Cuba and giving her a place 
among the nations of the earth. 
Now, what were the forces, problems, and emotions back 
of the sentiment which resulted in America's intervention 
by force in Cuba's political affairs? 
For most of the research material studied In order to 
find the answer to the above question the writer is indebted 
to the State Library and the Library of the State Historical 
Society, Topeka, Kansas. A great deal was found while 
studying in the library of the Kansas State College. Then, 
too, the public library and the Junior College Library of 
Independence, Kansas, were used very profitably. 
Chief among those persons who were of assistance were 
Dr. James E. Ackert, Dean of the Division of Graduate Study, 
and Dr. Fred A. Shannon of the Department of History, both 
of the Kansas State College. Dr. Shannon, major instructor, 
not only called the writer down on many points but as con-
sistently helped him up on many others. Along with all who 
were directly and indirectly helpful in finding the answer, 
they have the writer's sincere thanks. 




I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 
Even before the establishment of the United States 
government Cuba had become an Island of interest to the 
people of the English colonies. Its geographical position, 
its agricultural resources, and its peculiar political and 
social conditions furnished the basis for this interest. 
Following America's entrance into the family of nations 
Cuba was a disturbing element in the western hemisphere even 
to the close of the nineteenth century. 
Previous to the year 1898 the United States had no def-
inite policy with reference to the island. Jefferson, Madi-
son, John Quincy Adams, Polk, Pierce, Buchanan, Grant, Cleve-
land, each with varying degrees of success had taken a hand 
in matters pertaining to its relations to the American 
nation. One great difficulty encountered was that even 
throughout the nineteenth century Spain continued to employ 
her ancient ideas of colonial government. Misgovernment at 
home and oppression of her colonies had kept her blinded to 
all modern change and improvement"*". 
1 John Holladay Latane, The United States and Latin America 
(Garden City, 1927), p. 85; Literary Digest, Vol. XV 
(November 27, 1897), p. 921; Walter Millis, The Martial 
Spirit (Boston, C. 1931), p. lO. 
In 1897 Albert Bushness Hart said, "The Cuban contro-
versy has not been sought by the United States; it arises 
out of the geographical and political conditions of 
America", Looking back over the pages of nineteenth century 
history one Is impressed with the various situations, mili-
tary and political, which have been of concern to the United 
States, natural outgrowth of "the geographical and political 
2 ! conditions of America" . 
When the last insurrection in Cuba against Spain was 
in progress the people of the United States for more than 
a hundred years had been In the enjoyment of a republican 
form of government. Misgovernment and chronic revolution 
right near them Increased their traditional dislike for the 
methods employed by Spain to control her island dependency . 
In Cuba was still employed the regime of the sixteenth 
century, exploitation wholly in the interest of Spain her-
self4. 
2 Albert Bushness Hart, "A Century of Cuban Diplomacy, 1795-
1895" in Harper's Monthly Magazine, Vol. XCVII (June-
November G. Adams, History of 
Foreign Diplomacy of the United States (New York, 1926), 
p. 263. 
3 Wichita Daily Beacon, April 24, 1898, p. 2; Quoted from 
New York Sun in Literary Digest, Vol. XI (July 13, 1895), 
p. 303. 
4 G.H.D. Gossip, "The Mournful Case of Cuba", in Fort-
nightly Review, Vol. XCIII, N.S. (May, 1898), pp. 833-843. 




Peculiarities of race and the economic policy of 
Spain had developed in the island two parties, Liberal or 
Popular, and Aristocratic. The former was dominated by a 
small number of comparatively wealthy negroids. The latter 
was made up largely of Spanish men of wealth and authority, 
and they neither showed nor possessed sympathy for any popu-
lar movement. Between Aristocrat and Liberal the line was 
sharply drawn, and, owing largely to the antagonisms ex-
isting between these two forces, misgovernment in Cuba in-
creased in intensity. After the close of the Civil War in 
the United States the American people noticed more than 
ever evidences of misgovernment. However, by the end of 
the Ten Years War Spain had given assurance of a more lib-
eral treatment of the Cubans. But Spanish promises to 
Cuban Liberals did not materialize and matters grew worse 
even than formerly5. 
But the chief reason, for the bitterness of Cuban 
liberals toward Spanish autocracy was to be found in the 
despotic power given by Spain to her governors-general. 
Although the world of commerce and politics had changed, 
Spain's attitude toward her only remaining colonies seemed 
5 Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People (New 
York, 1902), Vol. V, p. 250. 
7 
8 
unchanging as the laws of the Medes and Persians. In Cuba 
was neither security for person nor property, nor any ap-
proach toward freedom of speech or of worship6. The situa-
tion thus brought about could not but involve the United 
States, and all through the century there had been found 
Americans who advocated measures to compel Spain to leave 
7 the island , 
However, by the close of the Ten Years War in Cuba the 
United States had begun a series of moves that later result-
ed in a very definite attitude toward both Cuba and Spain. 
Economic changes rapidly brought about political and diplo-
matic consequences so that when, in 1895, another insurrec-
tion broke out in the island America as a nation soon be-
came actively Interested. For even in the early part of 
this uprising of 1895 reports giving melancholy accounts of 
the conditions under which the Cubans were suffering began 
to come from the island. For awhile these attracted little 
attention, but as time passed and each side practiced its 
cruelties upon helpless victims, reports, official and un-
official, called attention to the frightfulness of the 
8 situation . Then from Havana came Consul A. C. Brice's 
a °George H. Stewart, Latin America and the United States 
(New York, 1928), p. 192. 
7 Hart in Harper's Monthly Magazine, loc. cit., p. 128. 
®Wilson, op. cit., pp. 250-252, 273; Edward Stanwood, 
History of the Presidency 1897-1916 (Boston, 1916),pp. 9-11. 
report in the autumn of 1897, and the natural sympathy of 
Americans was deeply stirred.® 
The administration had early looked into the matter, 
studying the situation from official reports. On Decem-
ber 7, 1896, President Cleveland took notice of the situa-
tion publicly in his message to congress. In this document 
the President showed plainly that he wished to maintain 
neurality as between insurgents and Spain, but at the same 
time he objected to control of the island by any other 
foreign power. "The entire country is given over to 
anarchy or is subject to military occupancy by one or the 
other party", he stated. Further, he pointed out other 
reasons than sentiment, other ways "both vexatious and 
costly" in which his country was involved. He suggested 
that, if things did not change for the better, higher 
lO 
obligations would supersede ordinary ones. 
Generally this part of the message referring to the 
situation in Cuba was well received by the press of the 
country. The whole matter previously had been so confused 
that no one seemed to understand it well enough to justify 
9 French Ensor Chadwick, Relations of United States and 
Spain (New York, 1909), p. 503. 
10James D. Richardson, editor, Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents (New York, 1915), Cleveland's Message of 
December 7, 1896, Vol. Vill, pp. 6148-6154. 
9 
— I 
opinion or action. Reports ordinarily were from sources 
bitterly antagonistic to each other, and therefore untrust-
worthy.'1'* Thus in reality this message of the President 
12 
was a source of relief to the American public. 
In his report to his chief executive, Richard Olney of 
the State Department had had this to say: "The situation 
in Cuban affairs seems to me one calling for careful con-
sideration of the Executive". He further informed the 
President that the Spaniards claimed the Cubans incompetent 
to maintain a decent government if given an opportunity. 
However, he maintained that, according to his knowledge of 
them, the insurgents were not the scum of the earth and 
called the revolution "just, in itself".*5 Upon such re-
ports and suggestions as those of Olney the President based I his conclusions in the message of December 7, 1896. 
In this message Cleveland had written of affairs in 
I 
Cuba as being almost America's affairs. Canovas, Minister 
of Spain, took emphatic exception to this postulate. Ac-
cording to Canovas, the conflict In Cuba was nobody's 
11 New York Times as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XIV 
(December 19, 1896), p. 197; Millis op. cit., p. 60. 
12 Literary Digest, Vol. XIV (December 19, 1896), p. 196; 
Brooklyn Eagle~as cited in American Press Opinion, 
April 19, 1898, p. 429. 
13 Robert McElroy, Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman (New York, 19S2S), Vol. I I , pp. 245-247. 
lO 
11 
business except that of Spain and the insurgents. He let 
it be known that he was not at all in love with what he used 
to call in moments of bitterness America's *blood and thunder 
-.4 n 1 4 
policy". 
Throughout all the troublous times of this rebellion 
Spain generally had shown a tendency toward indifference 
concerning America's interests in the island and consequent 
diplomatic inquiry. By the time McKinley had taken up the 
work of his administration this failure to act promptly had 
begun to enrage the readers of American papers, and these 
readers were numbered by millions. Minister Stewart L. 
Woodford endeavored to move diplomacy more rapidly, but 
Spain could not be aroused to respond. However, Woodford 
always felt that if the American congress had not been too 
eager for action he could have accomplished all that was 15 
needed without war and bloodshed. 
What was styled by the New York World as "the most im-
portant document of the war", signed January 27, 1897, was 
a written offer made by Cisneros, President of the provision-
al government and countersigned by Gomes, commander of the 
14Charles Benaist, "Revue des Deux Mondes" quoted by 
Living Age, Vol. CCXVII (May 28, 1898), p. 627. 
Frederic L. Paxson, Recent History of the United States 
(Boston, 1926), p. 257; Paxson, History of the American 
Frontier (Boston, 1924), p. 85. 
12 
Cuban Army, to enter negotiations with Spain. Two state-
ments in their offer attract attention here: "inadvisable 
for the United States to intervene as arbiter", and "pro-
vided always that the island of Cuba will not sacrifice 
thereby her own sovereignity".^-6 The basis of this pro-
posal was independence for Cuba. Spain had persistently 
refused to treat on this basis, and thus in a way this 
proposal really blocked diplomacy. 
At this time pressure upon the President to refer the 
whole Cuban matter to congress was becoming great. The 
financial interests of the United States were opposed to 
any radical moves toward intervention because of the pos-
sible effects of a war upon business at that time. News-
paper men and congressmen, preachers and politicians, beset 
the President directly and indirectly, coming and going, 
and his War Secretary openly claimed that the President was 
in danger of ruining himself and his party by the course he 
was pursuing. Still the chief executive strove to stem the j 
17 
tide. At the same time he continued to press the Spanish 
government to make peace with her Cuban subjects and end 
the trouble.*8 
^Independence, Kansas, Morning Reporter, February 25, 
1897, p. 1. 
17C. S. Olcott, Life of William McKinley (Boston, 1916), 
p. 394. 
18Wilson, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 273; Millis, op. cit., p. 80.' 
13 
In his first annual message to congress, December 6, 
1897, McKinley showed plainly his already quite evident in-
tentions to give Spain due consideration at this crisis in 
her history.19 "it is honestly due her", so the message 
ran, "that she be given a reasonable chance to realize her 
expectations and to prove the asserted efficiency of the 
new order of things". Whatever action America should take 
would be such as to deserve to meet the approval of the 
world.20 
This message, while quieting to the nerves of the big 
business interests whose medium was Mark Hanna, was disap-
Pi 
pointing to the multitude who clamored for intervention. 
Hannis Taylor, ex-minister to Spain, was a good representa-
tive of the radical branch of this portion. Taylor 
characterized It as a heartless, selfish message, and let 
it be known that "there are limits to the patience of the 
American people".22 Instead of war the President was for 
peace, so the war party of the nation felt. 
19 New York Daily Tribune, April 5, 1898, p. 6; Millis, 
op. cit., p. 60. 
20 Richardson op. cit., Vol. VIII, o. 6262; Millis, op. cit., 
p. 90. 
21William Allen White, Masks in a Pageant (New York, 1928), 
p. 176; Omaha World-Herald quoted in Literary Digest, 
Vol. XV (December 18, 1897), p. 996. * 
22 Literary Digest, Vol. XV (December 18, 1897), p. 995. 
In the winter of 1897-1898, Fitzhugh Lee, United 
States consul-general to Cuba, made two reports upon the 
condition of the concentration camps that further aroused 
the American public. When these reports and others of 
similar nature were given to the world, no further testi-
er 
mony was required. The stories of starvation and hopeless 
agony that had been published in the press were practically 
verified, even those of the most rabid type, however ficti-24 
tious may have been the story published. 
Matters between the two nations were now near the 
breaking point. Meantime Spain had offered a form of auton-
omy to Cuba. Cuba would listen to nothing but independence. 
When a further move was made along this line, McKinley said 
he did not know exactly what autonomy meant as proposed by 
Spain. What he wished for Cuba was the rights that Canada 
possessed. He said he understood these.2® 
Contemporary with these events and stories of Spanish 
cruelty came the De Lome episode. In whatever way the 
letter written by De Lome may have been obtained, its con-
tents were published in the newspapers and that in itself 
23 Wilson,op. cit., Vol. V, p. 273; Topeka Daily Capital, 
April 2, 1898 P. 4; Chicago Tribune, April 15, 1898, p. 6. 
24 Chadwick, op. cit., pp. 503-504. 
25 Andrew Carnegie, Autobiography (Boston, 1920), p. 361. 
14 
15 
represented a force which the diplomat could not withstand. 
De Lome denied being implicated in any way, but he promptly I 
resigned. Whatever the nature of his mistakes at this time, 
probably his greatest error was in his insulting character-
oet ization of the American newspaper. 
Almost coincident with the De Lome disturbance and 
i more far reaching in its effects upon the diplomacy of the 
situation, was the blowing up of the Maine in Havana harbor,! 
27 
February 15, 1898. The first news of this disaster 
flashed over the wires amazed the Americans. "A more 
startling occurrence could scarcely be conceived in view of 
the state of feeling existing between the United States and 
Spain f 2 8 
The findings of the United States Naval Court appointed 
to investigate the sinking of the Maine were to the effect 
that it was sunk by a mine or torpedo on the outside. These 
were submitted to the congress in a special message March 28, 
29 
1898. The message, following as it did reports quite 
authentic, served to intensify the feeling among Americans 
26 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (February 19, 1898), p. 211; 
Carnegie, op. cit., p. 361; New York Dally Tribune, 
February 16, 1898, p. 6. 
27 Ibid., February 19, 1898, p. 6. 
P Q 
Chicago Daily Tribune, February 17, 1898; Literary Digest, 
Vol. XVI (February 2 6 , 1898), p . 241. 
29 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (April 9, 1898), p. 421; 
Congressional Record, 55 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 31, 
Part 4, March 28, 1898, p. 3278. 
16 
that intervention must come, and that it should not be much 
longer delayed.30 
Spain had proposed that a board of inquiry be chosen 
from the naval powers, but the United States would not agree 
to this. Each government had then proceeded on its own way 
to its findings. Spain found that the explosion which de-
stroyed the battleship was from the inside, and that no 
responsibility for its destruction rested upon Spain or 
31 
Spaniards in Cuba. The reception of this report and the 
President's message to congress on the same subject simply 
increased the already bitter feeling toward Spain. The 32 
masses were now more than ever for war. 
In this connection the Literary Digest gave a most ex-
cellent account of an interview with Robert T. Lincoln, 
former secretary of war. Lincoln was quoted as saying that 
on entering the harbor of Havana the commander of the Maine 
did so with full "understanding that it was a "fortified 
harbor, and took all chances of accident or acts which — — 
30 
John H. Latane, America's Foreign Policy (Garden City, 
1925), p. 499; New York Daily Tribune, April 2, 1898, p.6.! 
31"United States Spanish Report" in Senate Report No. 885, 
54 Congress, 2 Session. 
32 Latane, Foreign Policy, p. 506; Randolph G. Adams, History! 
Of the Foreign Policy of the United States (New York, 
1926), p. 273. 
17 
might be done by Spain or for whom Spain is not responsible". 
But the Digest told its readers that Professor H. E. von 
Hoist of Chicago University, an authority on international 
law, took exception to this view. Hoist maintained that in 
any case supposable, Spain was responsible and liable for 
damages "if it be true that the place of anchorage was as-
33 
signed to the Maine by Spanish officials". Thus these two 
views, opposite and pointedly stated, went before the Ameri-; 
can people, each helping somebody to form a definite conclusion 
in his own mind, or both together being confusing to 
others, as the case might be. 
Newspaper agitation for war found its most rabid advo-
cate at this time in the New York Journal. According to 
these "war papers" nothing but intervention would satisfy 34 
the American people. Certain other papers, notably the 
Evening Post, also of New York, as vigorously opposed armed 
intervention.35 At the same time many prominent citizens 
of the nation, not representatives of any publication, 
visited the island and made a study of the situation. j 33 Hermann Eduard von Holst in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(March 5, 1898), p. 271. 
34 
H. Melvin Lee, History of American Journalism (New York, 
1923), p. 367. 35 Allan Nevins, The Evening Post (New York, 1922), p. 509; 
Literary Digest", V o l . XVI (April 2, 1898), p. 392. 
18 
j 
Interviews and statements made by these upon their return 
almost without exception substantiated the claims of the 
war crowd, even those of the sensational press. This was 
true as to the nature of conditions on the island, but not 
36 
always so as to specific events. 
Among these reports, the outstanding one, the one that 
attracted nearest to nation-wide attention, was the "state-
ment" of Redfield Proctor, United States senator from Ver-
mong, March 17, 1898, and next day reported throughout the 
nation.37 In this statement Proctor dwelt particularly 
upon the treatment of Cubans by Spanish officials, and his 
statements were based largely upon his own personal observa-
tions, reinforced by information gained in interviews with 
responsible persons. His vivid and apparently unvarnished 
account of the desolation and distress which he had witness-
ed in the concentration areas coming close upon the destruc-
tion of the Maine, had aroused the public to the point 
practically of demanding that the government take measures 38 to end the misrule in Cuba. 
36 Julian Hawthorne, The United States In Nations of the 
World (New York, 1858), Vol. III, p. 1 0 6 6 ; Literary Digest, 
Vol. XVI (April 2, 1898), p. 391. 
37 
Redfield Proctor in Congressional Record, 55 Congress, 
2 Session, p. 2916; Outlook, Vol . LV111 (tflarch, 1898), 
p. 759 38 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (March 26, 1898), p. 361; Millis 
op. cit., pp. ill, 123. 
19 
A well known newspaper stated the situation thus: 
"There has been a Cuban question In the United States most 
of the time since the republic came into existence. This 
was inevitable from the proximity of the Island to our 
shores, and its importance in many ways to our interests". 
The closing sentences follow* "Since the Civil War in the 
United States ended with the disappearance of slavery, the 
United States has presented a more united front on the 
question. There is no North or South in the matter now. 
A free and independent Cuba is now considered possible and 
also desirable".3^ 
By the first of April, 1898, conflicting desires for 
peaceful settlement of the Cuban crisis and for ending 
Spain's dominion in the island by force, were weighing 
heavily, not alone upon the government at Washington, but 
upon the minds of peace loving citizens throughout the land. 
In an issue of the Outlook at this time, the matter was thus 
neatly summed up: "The action of this nation cannot be de-
termined by President or congress; in the last analysis it 
must be determined by the people. And the questions before 
them are profoundly religious ones: Does this nation owe 
39 
Kansas City Star, April 24, 1898, p. 4. 
20 
any duty to the people of Cuba? Ought we to interfere? If 
40 
so, in what spirit? Por humanity"? To the answer of such 
questions as these America was now being fruitlessly em-
ployed.41 
On April 5 Consul-general Fitzhugh Lee had been recall-
ed from Cuba and directed to bring with him all American 
citizens desiring to return. Still Spain had taken no steps 
whatever toward any agreement with the United States looking 
to the future of Cuba, especially in so far as America's 
interests were concerned. This failure to exercise the 
courtesies of diplomacy had served to widen the breach, and 4-2 
to hasten the critical moment. 
In a special message to an eagerly awaiting congress, 
April ll, 1898, President McKinley outlined reasons that 
would justify American intervention in Cuban affairs. These 
reasons were: first, interest of humanity; second, protec-
tion of American interests in Cuba; third, protection to 
commerce; fourth, to end a menace to peace. "The only hope 
of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be 
endured is enforced pacification of Cuba." In this message 
40 Outlook as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (April 9, 
1898), p. 439. 
41 
Chicago Tribune, April 2, 1898, p. 6; New York Daily 
Tribune, April 12, 1898, p. 6. 
42 Wichita Dally Eagle, April 6, 1898, p. 1; April 19, 1898, 
p. 1; New York Daily Tribune, April 20, 1898, p. 6. 
the President informed congress that he had reached the end 
of diplomacy with Spain, and he awaited the action of that 
body, ready to use the executive authority to the limit.43 
Notwithstanding the fact that for six months the major-
ity of congressmen had been clamoring loudly for interven-
tion, even censuring the President in very uncomplimentary 
terms, the pointedness of this message struck them with 
amazement. The chief executive had thrown the burden of 
any move upon the legislative body. For this he was later 
violently denounced and accused of cowardice, although the 
Constitution of the United States gives to that branch alone 
the power to declare war, and many of them had long been 
demanding war, and had called lustily for "Cuba Libre". 
But many of the members were in sympathy with the President, 
and in a few days a decided majority endorsed his plan and 
44 
acted upon his suggestions. 
The nation at this time was probably the nearest united 
it had ever been upon any national or international matter 4= of Importance. The New York Tribune in an editorial, 
43 Richardson, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 6289-6292; New York 
Dally Tribune, April 12, 1898, p. 6. 
44 Kansas City Star, April 14, 1898, p. 4; Charles Curtis 
in Topeka Daily Capital, April ll, 1898, p. 1. 
45 Topeka Daily Capital, April 12, 1898, p. 4; New York 
Daily Tribune, Apr il 12, 1898, p. 6. 
21 
April 18, called the message a plan for attaining the de-
sired end in the simplest, easiest, quickest way. In an 
editorial April 12, The Kansas City Star told its readers 
that the President had outlined arguments which justified 
intervention, and the Chicago Tribune of the same date did 
not care to listen to the latest offer of Spain, and ex-
pressed the belief that the best answer would be a declara-
tion of war. 
April 19, 1898, the Senate and House agreed on the res-
olution that Cuba ought to be free and independent. The 
President was directed to make demands at once for Spain's 
evacuation of Cuba, and to intervene by force if Spain re-
fused to comply with the demands. On the twentieth the 
resolutions were passed and promptly signed by the Presi-
dent. Spain looked upon this as a declaration of war, and 
Minister Woodford was dismissed by that government. The 
Spanish minister at Washington demanded his passports, and 
46 
diplomatic relations between the two nations were ended. 
46 
Wilson, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 274; Chicago Tribune, April 
19, 1898~.~TT"April 25, 1898, p.~B"7 New York Daily 
Tribune, April 21, 1898, p. 6. 
22 
23 
II IDEALISTIC MOTIVES 
When in 1895 the last uprising in Cuba against Spain 
had begun, Maximo Gomez, Cuban commander in the Ten Years 
War, had again taken charge of affairs. In a short time 
the contest between Cuban and Spaniard had become one of 
total disregard for life or property. Gomex laid the land 
waste in order to starve the Spaniards, and Spain retali-
ated by wanton destruction of Cuban life and property. It 
was "a war of absolutely no quarter".1 
The first expedition sent out by Spain was under com-
mand of general Campos. His work, destructive as it was, 
was not satisfactory to the home government, and he was re-
o 
placed by General Victoriano Weyler. Soon after taking 
command Weyler issued his order of reconcentration: "All 
the inhabitants of the country now outside" or the fortifi-
cations should "concentrate themselves in the town so oc-
cupied by the troops". "The offenses enumerated when the 
law prescribes the death penalty" were to be dealt with 
"most summarily".5 This order, when carried out, caused the 
1Chicago Tribune, January 14, 1898, p. 6; George Bronson 
Rea, Facts and Fakes About Cuba (New York, 1897), p. 31; 
Fred Funston, Memories of Two Wars (New York, 1912), p. 92. 
2 James W. Garner and Henry Cabot Lodge, History of the 
United States (New York, 1906), Vol. IV, p. 1643. 
Chadwick, United States and Spain, p. 432. 
Cubans to crowd themselves into prescribed spaces about the 
fortified towns. Their homes were destroyed in accordance 
with the policies of both sides, and the land became a 
wilderness.4 Thousands died of starvation and disease, and 
to make the results the more deadly, Weyler gave his offi-
cers power of life and death over all people under their 
jurisdiction.5 
This process of suppression as carried out by Weyler 
and his officers caused hundreds of thousands to be placed 
within these camps, and finally exterminated about half of 
c them. Spaniards scoured the surrounding country and slew 
rt 
without mercy any insurgents captured.' Richard Olney, 
Secretary of State, In one of his reports to President 
Cleveland cited "the short and effective way the government tf P 
(of Spain} had of dealing with non-combatant suspects. 
Reports of these events reached the world through various 
channels, mainly newspapers. In Europe such reports were 
4 Wilson, History of the American People, Vol. V, p. 250; 
Fred Funston in Wichita Daily Eagle, January ll, 1898. 5 Garner and Lodge, op. cit., p. 1643; Standard History of 
the World, Vol. VIII pT~4419. 
® Hawthorne, The United States, V01. III, pp. 1061-1064; Senator Proctor's Statement in Congressional Record, 
55 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 31, pt. 3, March 17, 1898; 
Wilson, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 273. 
7McElory, Grover Cleveland, Vol. I, pp. 243-245. 
8Ibid., pp. 245-247; Millis, Martial Spirit, pp. 65-66. 
24 
25 
considered highly colored, but In the United States they 
were received as representative of conditions in Cuba if not 
Q 
wholly plausible. 
In this connection it is helpful to quote parts of a 
few of the numerous telegraph articles found in the Morning 
Reporter of Independence, Kansas. In various forms these 
appeared in other dailies of the nation and were read eager-
ly by a large portion of the population. The Reporter was 
a "small town daily" of the eight to twelve page variety, 
and T. N. Sickels, the publisher, was a good newspaper man 
with a tendency to be conservative even on the Cuban ques-
tion. This conservatism was not by any means due to lack 
of sympathy for suffering humanity, but was simply a matter 
or caution, a valuable characteristic of this fair minded 
gentleman. 
The following quotations and notations are largely 
headings. In a December, 1896, issue appeared this news: 
"St. Joseph, Dec. 2 - It is reported that there has been an 
enlistment of 150 (American ) men for the Cuban array, and 
that others are expected to join them when means of trans— 
M 10 portation have been properly arranged by the Cuban Junta . 
^Literary Digest, Vol. XV (June 12, 1897), p. 201. 
10 
Independence, Kansas, Morning Reporter, December 3, 1896, 
p. 1. 
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Two weeks later appeared these headings; "Friends of Cuba 
Active"; "Many Movements of Aid on Foot"; "Their Cause 
Growing"; "New York, Dec. 16 - Petition of New York Men 
Asked Congress to Put an End to Barbarities in Cuba".11 
Under headings of large capitals: "Key West, March 1 -
Women Misused in Cuba". In smaller capitals these appeared, 
"Story of an American Woman". "Arrested With Other Ladies 
T 2 
and Thrown into Prison". In May The Reporter gave this 
heading to reports of outrages in Cuba: "Great Suffering 
in Cuba". "Consuls Confirm The Worst Reports." "Many 
Americans In Want". In the same issue was this "Washing-
ton, May 15 - The Secretary of State has been receiving 
answers from consuls to his request for information in re-
gard to stories of outrages committed by Spanish upon 
Cubans. One consul said; "Things are growing worse every 
day. If that merciful country does not come to our aid, 
God only knows how many persons will die of starvation."^-5 
Under large capitals as headings: "Neutral Cubans Ask 
Aid" was printed a strange appeal "on behalf of the starv-
ing and dying reconcentrados" in Matanzas. Here are two 
^Independence, Kansas, Morning Reporter, December 17, 1896, 
p. 1. 
12 Ibid, March 1, 1897, p. 1; Hawthorne, op. cit., Vol. III, 
p. 1066. 
13 Morning Reporter, May 16, 1897, p. 1. 
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extracts: "We are compelled to witness day after day 
scenes of horror which no language can describe. And yet 
no voice can be lifted to protest". Again, "Upwards of 
10,000 victims of this savage system of warfare have been 
crowded into Matanzas without providing for their natural 
wants".14 The Morning Reporter was publishing the same 
type of news as was the Kansas City Star, The New York 
Daily Tribune, The Chicago Tribune, and the Topeka Capital. 
Early reports to the government had given as sad ac-
counts as any of these reported through channels of the 
press.15 October 15, 1897, Consul A. C. Brice of Matanzas 
stated that more than two thousand had died within his ter-
ritory since January 1. "In the Interior towns the situa-
tion is beyond belief. In some towns one-third of the 
population has disappeared". Other reports of Consuls and 
of representative citizens served but to Increase the re-
sentment felt toward Spanish treatment of their Cuban sub-
jects. Large headings such as: "Starving and Helpless 
14Morning Reporter, June 8, 1897, p. 1. 
15 Chadwick, op. cit., p. 503 
1^Standard History, Vol. VIII, p. 4228; Topeka Daily 
Capital, April 2, 1898, p. 4; Kansas City Star, April ll, 
1898, p. 1. 
People Piled in Ditches to Die", "Horror of the Ditches", 
17 
had a telling effect upon the American common people. 
In the winter of 1897-1898 the Kansas City Star sent 
an investigator to Cuba to make a special study of those 
matters which were disturbing the minds of his countrymen. 
In his report to The Star the investigator said, among other 
things: "You will find hunger standing virgil at the open 
entrance of huts In which the dying and dead lie almost 
equally inanimate."18 Immediately the "Star's Relief Ex-
pedition" was organized and supplies were sent to Matanzas. 
Later, W. G. Richardson who accompanied the expedition de-
clared that "The starvation policy seems to be endorsed by 
the Spanish people and officials."19 
But the most convincing of all the reports that reached 
the public was one to which reference has already been made, 
that of Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont, read before the 
Senate March 17, 1898. Proctor had been Secretary of War 
under President Harrison. At his own expense he began and 
carried out this special investigation, believing, as he 
said, that reports had been exaggerated. But what he heard 
17 The Nation, (February 24, 1898), p. 139; Kansas City Star, 
April ll, 1898, p. 1; Chicago Tribune, April 12, 1898, 
pt. ll, p. 9. 
18Kansas City Star, March 10, 1898, p. 1. 
19lbid, April 8, 1898, p. 1. 
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and saw there was "beyond description". "From all the sur-
rounding country", the statement read, "the people have been 
driven into fortified towns and held there to subsist as 
best they can". "There are frequent blockhouses enclosed 
by a trocha and with a guard along the railroad track. With 
this exception there is no human life or habitation between 
these fortified towns and villages.... I saw no house or 
hut in four hundred miles of railroad rides except 
within the Spanish trocha. It is concentration and desola-
tion conditions are unmentionable in this respect .... 
What wonder that one-half have died and that one-quarter of 
the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved 
What I saw I cannot tell so others can see it."20 
The outstanding result of the cumulative effect of all 
these reports was intense indignation within the United 
States. The worst conditions painted by the yellow journals 
however fictitious, were not more extreme than conditions 
appeared as reported from reliable sources, and Americans 
everywhere began to demand action, for the call of the 
20 
Congressional Record, 55 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 31, 
p. 2916; Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (April 2, 1898), p. 
391; Fred J. Matheson, "The United States and Cuban in-
dependence", in Fortnightly Review, Vol. LXIII, n.s. 
(May, 1898), p. 827; Millis, op. cit., p. 123. 
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starving had fallen upon listening ears. -1- President 
McKinley styled the measures employed to reduce Cubans to 
22 
submission as not civilized warfare but extermination. 
M. M. Murdock through the columns of his paper drew the con-
clusion that "Cuba must at this moment be a hell on earth".23 
To all thinking Americans Spain's methods were a species of 
barbarism beyond understanding, especially so when employed 24 
by a part of the world supposed to be civilized. 
There seems to be no agreement as to how far humanitarian 
reason may be employed toward intervention in such a 
situation. How far may a neutral go on the basis of 
humanity and still be on a reasonable basis of international 
understanding? To what extent do "the dictates of humanity" 
govern such situations? Under which heading would it come, 
"Self Preservation", or, "Balance of Power"? Or has America 
added a third?26 
21 James Morgan, Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1919), pp. 
104-130; Literary~Digest, Vol. XVI (March 2 6, 1898), p. 
361; Millis, op. cit., p. 110. 22 James Ford Rhodes, McKinley and Roosevelt's Administra-
tions (New York, 1922), p. 44; Millis, op. cTF., pr~138. 
23 WIchlta Daily Eagle, March 10, 1898, p. 10. 24 Kansas City Star, April ll, 1898, p. 1; Democrat and 
Chronicle, quoted In Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (April 2, 
1898), p. 393. 
25Charles R. Lingley, Since the Civil War (New York, 1926), 
p. 389. 
26Theodore S. Woolsey in Independent, Vol. L (March 17, 
1898), p. 331. 
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Until the latter part of 1897 Europe, according to 
clippings from leading publications of the continent, could 
see no grounds for America's intervention in the Spanish-
27 
Cuban crisis. By the close of that year, however, the 
justice of such an act was becoming apparent to them, al-
though they doubted that humanity was a very real force 28 
back of America's agitation. The people of the United 
States, however, by the very nature of their growth as a 
nation and of their ideals as a civilized people, found it 
practically impossible to remain indifferent in the face of 29 
stories coming daily from Cuba. Discussion and villifica-
tion had become exceedingly tiresome to them. "Within the 
United States public sympathy permeated all parties." Tales 
of suffering read and repeated over and over had stirred 
them deeply, and the pressure of this feeling toward action 3f) in favor of Cuba was becoming irresistable. In the light 
27Llterary Digest, Vol. XV (October 16, 1897), p. 773. 
28 
Hamburger Nachrichten, as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. 
XVI (April 30, 1898), p. 532; London Spectator as cited 
in Living Age, Vol. CCXVII (May 28, 1898), p. 610. 
290lcott, Life of McKinley, p. 394; Chicago Journal as 
cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (March 19, 1598), 
p. 331; Millis, op. cit., pp. 137-140. 
30 ,, n Matheson, "United States and Cuban Independence", loc. 
cit., p. 828; New York Times as cited in Literary Digest, 
Vol. XVI (April 9, 1898), p. 426. 
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of the things the Americans had by this time heard and 
witnessed could they well be censured for showing impatience 
at the seeming dilatory action of their government? They 
let it be known at Washington that they were weary of 
waiting.31 
The United States government by this time had reached 
the point in diplomatic relations with Spain at which no 
offers could be entertained that did not have their setting 
32 
in independence for Cuba. Even by the beginning of the 
year 1898 the great majority of Americans had become almost 
irreconcilably set against Spain. As the year advanced 
various issues had become more involved and emotions stirred 
Not least among the factors involved was that of human 
sympathy. The fundamental impulse beneath this was plain 33 American sentiment. In fulfilling its high mission to 
restore peace to a troubled people, America took up the 
. 34 sword. 
31 
Topeka Daily Capital, April 5, 1898, p. 1; New York 
Journal as cited in American Press Opinion, February 16, 
1898, p. 429; Congressional Record, 55 Congress, 2 Session 
Vol. 31, part 4, p. '3278; Idem, pp. 3701 and 3704. 
John H. Latane "intervention of the United States in 
Cuba", cited in North American Review, Vol. CLXVI, p. 351; 
Kansas City Star, April 12, 1898, p. 4; April 23, 1898, 
p. 4. 33 
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III CLASH OP CIVILIZATIONS 
In seeking to discover the great moral forces back of 
the immediate conditions which brought on the Spanish-
American War one must not overlook national characteristics. 
Their presence was evident and their relation to the Cuban 
situation plainly revealed. In 1898 the "irrepressible con-
11 
flict was drawing to a crisis. 1 However, in making the 
above statement Olcott had in mind mainly the conflicting 
ideals which had been a burden upon diplomacy for more than 
a hundred years. Centuries back of Jay's time must one go 
for the fundamental differences which made the clash 
inevitable. 
In tracing these differences in characteristics be-
tween the two civilizations one may reasonably go back to 
the fifteenth century. But even here we find divergencies 
which made the Reformation the gigantic struggle which in 
turn intensified national traits already in strong con-
trast.3 These differences later became exemplified mainly 
in religious beliefs and right of worship, and by the close 
of the sixteenth century they manifested themselves largely 
1 London Spectator, in Living Age, Vol. CCXVII (May 28, 1898), 
p. 610; Olcott, William McKinley, Vol. 1, p. 394. 2 
Chadwick, United States and Spain, pp. 431-433; Outlook, 
Vol. LIX (June, 1898), p. 113; Wichita Dally Eagle; 
March 22, 1898, p. 4; The Nation, March 3, 13987 p. 157. 
3Staats Zeitung as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XIV 
(January 19, 1897), p. 291. 
in strife between Catholicism represented by Spain and 
4 
Protestantism represented by England. 
At this time there was being employed by Spain against 
the heretics within her realms what is known as the Spanish 
Inquisition. The Inquisition as generally employed through-
out the Catholic world was a regular part of Church Govern-
5 
ment. The basis of faith upon which the institution was 
operated, was that religious infidelity is a sin to be 
punished both in this world and in the world to come. But 
the extreme form, the one which made it particularly 
anathema to Protestants of northern Europe, was the Spanish 
Inquisition. As practiced by Spanish churchmen upon un-
believers even of their own nation it sifted out for de-
struction thousands of the strongest hearts and best brains, 
and thus had a tendency to bring upon the nation an intel-
lectual blight. In northern Europe the extreme operation 
of the Holy Office raised serious opposition and "the very t i n name of the institution was not heard without a shudder. ' 
4 London Spectator, op. cit., p. 610. 5 ' 
Archibald Wilberforce, History of Spain, (in Nations of 
the World, New York, 1898), pp. 94-95. 
6Ibld., p. 95. 
n Wolfgang Menzel, Germany (Nations of the World, New York, 
1898), Vol. Ill, p. 946; Gossip, "Mournful Case of Cuba", 
In Fortnightly Review, Vol. LXIII, p. 838. 
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The discovery of America gave to Spain a new world, 
and she lost no time in occupying her new realms. It was a 
real conquest, a sweeping conquest when one considers the 
century in which it took place. Spanish language, Spanish 
forms of government and of church activities were extended 
to every part on which the Spaniard set his foot. Por more 
than three centuries he ruled this new world. Absolutism 
is the term by which it is known to the historian: complete 
powers employed by officials sent out by the government, 
and no expression of popular opinion tolerated. Within 
this period Spain laid waste whole empires in the new world, o 
and exterminated vast populations. 
By the advent of the Seventeenth century Spain and 
England represented different ideals of human relationships 
and of government.^ In Spain the ruling power continued to 
be as in former centuries, from king to subjects. In Eng-
land the opposite was being contended for and was soon to 
become the rule, the king received authority from his 
people. These very marked differences in the mother count-
ries were noticeable in their colonies. Although selfish-
ness, even heartlessness often entered into English 
8 
William W. Sweet, History of Latin America (New York, 
1919), p. 140. 9 Kansas City Star, April 18, 1898, p. 4. 
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colonial enterprises, still the struggle for equal rights 
showed marked gains -- the right to own property secured toy 
honest toil, the right to toe freemen in a free land. In 
this way the traits of the mother countries were retained 
and by the middle of the eighteenth century the contrast be-
tween these two types had become even more noticeable in 
their colonial possessions. 
Following the war of the American Revolution America 
was, from a diplomatic point of view, quickly accepted into 
the family of nations. Spain, however, was more tardy of 
recognition than were England, France and Holland, because 
the new nation was one of liberals in government. She alone 
of the nations of Europe seemed to sense the actual signifi-
cance of establishing in the new world an independent nation 
of any politics whatever. She seemed to see in a dim way 
the eventual breaking away of the world from the ancient 
ideals of civilization. But even Spain did not see the near 
approach of the day America would disturb the world's bal-1 0 
ance of power. 
In the United States those ideals of individual rights 
which had been developed on the great frontier had 
10 John H. Latane, America A World Power (New York, 1907), 
pt). 303-320; Kansas City Star, April 19, 1898, p. 4. 
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culminated in a free America, and by the close of the nine-
teenth century had broadened till they comprehended condi-
tions and situations of which the fathers had no dreams. 
The success of the move for human rights soon became evident 
to the world. The United States was a liberal republic be-
cause those principles of liberty that had appeared under 
bitter circumstances in Europe had been given, in America, 
opportunity for great development. 
In this century America had been in antagonistic con-
tact with the results of Spanish rule in Latin America. The 
more the people of the States witnessed the rule of Spain 
and, later, of Spanish American States the more they dis-
liked it. So it "was to be expected that in such a question 
as that of Cuba, its base of reasoning would be the inher-
ited views of many generations, and that its starting point 
would be that Spain was wrong".1"1" There is so little in 
common between the Teutonic Americans and the Spanish Amer-
icans, almost nothing "except two names, the name America 
and the name republican", that diplomatic and economic re-
12 
lations have always been easily strained. So when Ameri-
cans had fully turned their attention to Spanish-Cuban 
11Chadwick, op. cit., p. 432. 
12 
Sweet, op. cit., p. 253; Arthur E. Elliott, Paraguay 
(New York, 1931), pp. 69 and 77. 
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matters it was difficult to keep passion from taking the 
place of reason. Carnegie called the Spanish-American War 
"a war of passion started by reports of horrors of the 
Cuban revolution". Another said, "One wonders if the deep 
lust for conquest was not in our hearts in those days", and 
•I 
the historian called it "a war of impulse". 
A noted eastern journal referring to the American re-
action toward the Cuban insurrection said, "The love of 
Freedom is so inborn in the American mind that the great 
majority of our people naturally sympathize with them (the 
Cubans) in their effort to throw off their shackels". 
Throughout the days of the insurrection and the war of 1898 
expressions of this kind were of common occurrence. A free 
and self governing island of Cuba was the sentiment freely 14 
expressed, and sentiment rules all great events. 
In parallel directions these two types of modern ideals 
moved westward across the continent. The one broadened its 
pathway toward the south, the other pressed northward. The 
outstanding characteristics of each could be traced far back 
15 Carnegie, Autobiography, p. 361; White, Masks in a Pageant, 
p. 176; Woodrow Wilson, History of American People, p. 
274. 
14 
Boston Journal as cited In Literary Digest, Vol. Xl 
(July 13, 1895), p. 303; The Forum as cited in Literary 
Digest, Vol. XVI (June ll, 1898), p. 697. 
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Into the past. Within the nineteenth century they had 
clashed along the Rio Grande. By the close of that century 
15 
they were again to come to grips. The original source of 
that sympathy which was willing to shed American, blood to 
give freedom to Cubans was in race and national ideals. 
The struggle was an inevitable clash between two types of 16 civilization widely at variance. 
IV MATERIAL MOTIVES FOR INTERVENTION 
The first real view Americans ever secured of Cuba was 
in the French and Indian War. In 1762 the British-American 
forces captured Havana, even then a flourishing city, and 
held it till after the treaty of 1763 after which England 
returned the island to its original possessors. But the 
conquest of the region had awakened the people of America to 
its possibilities, and from that date on down the decades 
there has been considerable attraction toward these parts, 
increasing as time has passed. 
Jefferson, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams, all three 
looked forward to the time when Cuba would become part of 
the United States. Jefferson, after his success in the 
150utlook, Vol. LIX (June, 1898), pp. 113-114; Detroit 
Tribune as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XIV (December 19,! 
1896), p. 197. 
16 Paxson, The New Nation, pp. 258-275; Literary Digest, 
Vol. XVI (June ll, 1898), p. 695; Chicago Tribune, 
April 28, 1898 6 ; Latane T h e United States and Latin America, p. 133 
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acquisition of Louisiana, came to look upon the island as 
being the most interesting of the future acquisitions to 
out system of states. Adams and Monroe looked upon both 
Cuba and Porto Rico as by nature really a part of the United 
States, and they felt that annexation was necessary for the 
integrity of the Union itself.1 Following the annexation 
of Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and the Mexican cessions of 
1848 and 1853, many other statesmen felt that Cuba should 
be the next to come within the territorial limits of the 
Union. Two outstanding arguments for this were, protection 
of the mouth of the Mississippi, and manifest destiny. Cor-
ollary to this was slavery extension. 
The longing for possession of the island had become so 
great that by the time of Polk's administration, James Buc-
hanan, secretary of state, tried to purchase the island 
from Spain, even offering a hundred million dollars for com-
plete possession. The offer was turned down. By 1854 there 
was strong feeling that America would be justified in wrest-
ing the island by force from Spain. This found expression 
in what is now known as the Ostend Manifesto. In this 
Manifesto Pierre Soule, minister to Spain, John Y. Morgan, 
minister to France, and James Buchanan, minister to England, 
1 Latane, America's Foreign Policy, pp. 98 and 287; Mi His, 
Martial Spirit, p. 12. 
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advised the United States Secretary of State, William L. 
Marcy, that if Spain could not be induced to sell Cuba, 
"then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified 
in wresting it from Spain if we have the power". Marcy lost 
no time in letting it be known that such would not be the 
policy of the administration, but "this amazing bit of af-
frontery" represented the sentiment of many in America at p 
that time. The results of the Civil War, however, served 
to modify decidedly the attitude of Americans toward forc-
ible seizure. 
"The Cuban controversy has not been sought by the 
United States", said a famous historian writing in Harpers 3 
in June, 1898. America was then at war with Spain, and 
foreign critics in particular were bitter in their censure 
or the United States, especially as to her avowed purposes 
for intervening in the matter of Cuba's political affairs. 
No one of them seemed to have any doubt but that the motive 4 
behind the move was territorial aggrandizement. 
Mr. Cleveland said in his message in December, 1896, 
that the spectacle of the mistreatment of Cubans was, "one 
2 Adams, Foreign Policy, p. 266; Millis, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
Hart, "A Century of Cuban Diplomacy", in Harpers Monthly 
Magazine, Vol. XCVII, p. 134. 
^"Spanish Views", cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XV (July 3, 
1897), p. 292* Hamburger Nachrichten as cited in Literary 
Digest, Vol. XVl (April 30, 1898),""p. 532. 
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which could not but engage the attention of the United 
States both by reason or its geographical position and the 
enormous financial interests of the American people in the 
island". More than seventy-five years before this time 
President Madison wrote: "The position of Cuba gives the 
United States so deep an interest in the destiny even of 
that island that they could not be satisfied spectators at 
its falling into the hands of any European government".5 
Dominating as it does the narrowest point of the much 
travelled waterway between the Atlantic seaboard and the 
Gulf of Mexico, the position of the island rendered it in-
creasingly important when viewed through the glasses of 
a 
Americans. 
When in 1895 the second great uprising in Cuba broke 
out the greatest desire of Americans was to see Cuba free, 
but even at that late date the idea of annexation was strong 7 in the minds of a few. Even down to the close of the cen-
Q 
tury Congress received petitions seeking annexation. 
Nevertheless, by this time American sympathy for Cuba was 
for other reasons and did not include taking the island 
5 
Latane, United States and Latin America, pp. 84-85. 
6Lingley, Since the Civil War, p. 385. 
7The New York Sun as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XI (July 13, 1895), p. 303 




into the nation's possessions. In 1895 the American 
Magazine of Civics even went so far in its efforts to learn 
the sentiment of the American people as to address a letter 
or inquiry to a number of prominent men asking each if he 
believed in annexation and, if so, by what means. A few of 
these favored annexation if accomplished by diplomacy. 
Many were opposed altogether, while others felt that if not 
now, it might be expedient at some future time."'"® 
The New York Herald advocated annexation as the best 
reason for war with Spain. "Any other policy even under the 
sympathetic name of Cuban independence would be aggrandize-
ment. A war for humanity would degenerate into a war for 
greed". So the Herald felt that at the bottom of the whole 
matter was the greed of territorial acquisition. In a few 
days, however, its views were modified.11 The Baltimore 
News said we did not want to annex Cuba, but went on to say 
that annexation was what interference would doubtless amount 
12 to. These two publications, like "big business" dreaded 
the interruption of the upward business trend or the time, 
g 
Paxson, Recent History of the United States, p. 234; 
Literary Digest, Vol. XVl (April 23, 1898), p. 482. 
10 
American Magazine of Civics as cited in Literary Digest, 
Vol. XI (July 13, 1895), p. 337. 
ll 
New York Herald as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(April 23, 1898), p. 485. 
12 
Baltimore News as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(February 26, 1898), p. 485. 
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and thus voiced a minority of considerable strength. But by 
April 19, 1898, the mass of Americans had almost abandoned 
any desire to annex the island of Cuba, however they might 
13 
feel toward driving Spain from her ancient heritage. 
Economic disturbances based on want, or greed, or dire 
necessity have always been strong factors in pitting nation 
against nation, tribe against tribe. By the latter part of 
the nineties of the last century the economic factor was 
evident in Cuba. Several American agencies were drawing 
large profits from their investments in the island. Euro-
pean financiers were interested in the security of Spanish 
bond3. The Catholic church held millions of similar securi-
ties. Conflicting interests, centering either in the island 
of Cuba or in Spain herself, so muddled the economic situa-
tion that even the wiser men of the United States were 
greatly puzzled over the question of what America should do 
in the crisis in Cuban affairs. "It was not until the re-
newal of the insurrection in 1895" that American economic 
interests in Cuba were strong enough to wield an influence 
favoring interference. According to generally accepted data,, 
Americans at that time had investments, "enormous financial 
13 Living Age, Vol. CCXVII (April 16, 1896), p. 505; Balti-
more News as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
February 26, 1898), p. 243. 
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interests", in Cuba to the amount of $50,000,000. Our 
minister to Spain, Stewart L. Woodford, expressed himself 
as reeling sure that he could solve the problem "with 
justice to Cuba and protection to our great American in-
terests" , 1 5 
But while taking time to solve the problem destruction 
was taking its terrible toll. General Maximo Gomez on tak-
ing command or the Cuban insurgents had ordered suspension 
of work on plantations, then later laid waste the land hop-
ing to starve out the Spaniards. ° Later General Weyler 
instituted a policy of destruction even more comprehensive 
than that of Gomez. As soon as he had his concentration 
campaign well under way, he began, in connection with this, 
his campaign of devastation to starve out the Cubans. Be-
tween the policies of Gomez and Weyler American business on 
17 
the island was almost ruined. This destruction of prop-
erty as well as loss of life was watched by the people of 
the United States, and by the beginning of McKinley's ad-
ministration intervention, by force if necessary, had be-
14 Latane, America as a World Power, p. 6; Cleveland's 
Message, December 4, 1896. 
15 
Rhodes, McKinley and Roosevelt, pp. 55-57; Millis, op. 
cit., p, 137. 16 Latane, America a World Power, pp. 4-27; Funston, 
Memories of Two Wars, p. 99. 
17 James C. Malin, Interpretation of Recent American History 
(New York, 1926), pp. 68-88; Funston, op. cit., p. 926. 
come almost a public demand, a demand audible even in 
Europe. uThe Americans have some justice to their cause by 
reason of the interests at stake and for the sake of 
18 
humanity. 
Not only was American business being destroyed in the 
island but a valuable commercial condition was being ruined 
Before the rebellion Americans were accustomed to send hun-
dreds of shiploads of American products to be exchanged for 
those of Cuba. Thus people of America found their sugar 
and tobacco trade badly damaged. They wondered if they were 
to continue to suffer such losses indefinitely. Why should 20 
not the government intervene and restore commerce? 
Early in April, 1898, attention was called to the is-
suance of Cuban bonds both by the Junta in New York and by 21 
provisional President Masso in Cuba. A These bonds were 
sold cheap,, but it was predicted that they would greatly 
advance in the event of Cuba's freedom. Bondholders would 
be losers if America did not intervene and free Cuba. This 
was a strong argument for war.^ 
18 
Independance Belgae as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(October 23, 1897), p. 773; Kansas City Star,"June 14, 
1898, p. 6. 19 Standard History, Vol. VIV, p. 4425. 
20 Olcott, Life of McKinley, Vol. 1, p. 394. 21 Chicago Herald cited in Wichita Daily Beacon, (April 7, 
iaya)7 p. 4. 22 Chicago Tribune, January 13, 1898, p. 1. 
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Wall Street, however, was generally opposed to any 
form of intervention beyond the safety diplomatic kind. 
This stand was due largely to the rapid growth of business 
along almost all lines in the United States. As the pres-
sure favoring intervention became greater upon the admini-
stration, Spanish bonds fell in value. By April 20, 1898, 
they were as low as 37 3/4. Anything in the nature of 
23 
foreign securities was of "uncertain value. The Chicago 
Tribune said there was but one thing for the President to 2-
say for Wall Street's benefit: "Get thee behind me, Satai. 
When the Pope offered to mediate there appears to have 
been other interests, minor in importance no doubt, aside 
from his natural interest for peace. One of these was the 
fact that the church owned millions in Spanish bonds, the 
security of which depended upon conditions in Cuba. Should 
Cuba win there might be a question of their value, but 
should the United States step in and win against Spain, 
these bonds would be greatly impaired in value to put it 
25 mildly. In sympathy both with the church and the Vatican 
many Roman Catholics in America opposed America's entrance 
into a war of intervention. 
— — — — — — — » i — — — — — — 
23 
Kansas City Star, April 14, 1898, p. 4, and April 20, 
1898, p. 1. 
24 The Chicago Tribune, March 14, 1898, p. 6. 




In the Autumn of 1897 the Sagasta government of Spain 
made overtures looking toward autonomy for Cuba. Cuba was 
to assume the entire public debt charged against her by 
Spain, and no customs union was to be permitted between the 
island and the United States. This could not be considered 
under the economic ruin in the island, for the debt was by 
this time over $400,000,000. Besides this, millions of 
Spanish bonds were secured by Cuban trade and were repre-
sented in this debt. By the time war was declared in 1898 
this debt was estimated at $600,000,000, a fearful burden. 
Those American capitalists who were directly interested 
in Cuba on account of investments there used all available 
influences to secure intervention. They took every advant-
age of the publications of the sensational press, and never 
failed to make the most of the humanitarian sympathies of 
Americans in this crisis. And when the Maine was sent to 
Cuba, politicians were set to talking and business began to 
fluctuate. "In event of a rupture" the battleship was in 
27 
the right place. 
Many students of the situation in Cuba were persuaded 
that destruction of American investments and the ruin of 
26 Kansas City Star, April 1, 1898, p. 1; J. H. Wilson, 
Under the old Flag (New York, 1912), Vol. ll, pp. 402-423. 
27 Wichita Daily Eagle, January 28, 1898, p. 4. 
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commerce with Cuba presented the strongest argument "deter-
mining American intervention". The burden of neutrality, 
the dictates of commercial interests, the call of humanity, 
all are international reasons for any government to inter-
fere in the affairs of another. Any one of these is 
28 
strong. So America went to war against Spain partly to 
make It possible for Americans to engage in business and 
hold property in a one time Spanish colonial possession. 
At the present writing (1931) United States citizens own 29 more than a billion dollars of the islands wealth. 
V OUTRAGED DIGNITY: THE MAINE 
In the winter of 1897-1898 while food and other sup-
plies were being distributed among the reconcentrados in 
Cuba, frequent complaint was made of the unfriendly atti-
tude of Spaniards toward those engaged in the various be-
nevolent activities. Rioters also were causing trouble for 
Consul-general Fitzhugh Lee. Upon General Lee's request for 
a battleship, the Maine was sent to Havana.'*" On the night 
of February 15, 1898, this ship was destroyed while at 
anchor in the harbor and 266 of her crew were killed. 
28 Theodore Woolsey in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (April 2, 
1898), p. 592. 29 Atlanta Constitution as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. 
XVI, (April 23, 1898), p. 485; Stewart, Latin America and the United States, p. 194; Kansas City Star, August 13, 
1931, p. 1. 
1 Wichita Daily Eagle. .January 28. 1898. o. 4. 
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Immediately news of this disaster was telegraphed to 
Washington, and next day in no uncertain terms the papers 
or the land called attention to the catastrophe. Prominent 
headings attracted at once the attention of the reader: 
"Battleship Maine Blown Up"; "Hundreds of Lives Lost"; "War-
ship Maine a Total Wreck".2 Under these and similar head-
ings was a great variety of subheads all calling attention 
»2 
to the various phases of the calamity. The news brought 
mourning into many neighborhoods, and officials at Washing-
ton were almost stunned. The effect upon diplomatic rela-
4 
tions must not be overlooked or underestimated. 
The conditions under which the Maine had been sent to 
Cuba were not at all pleasant, and newspaper correspondents 
were not slow to recognize the gravity of the situation and 
to make use of its possibilities.5 Neither Spanish offic-
ials nor Spanish populace had been friendly disposed toward 
the presence of the battleship in their harbor, and In vari-
ous ways they had permitted this to become known.6 The 
2 Wichita Daily Eagle, February 16, 1898, p. 1; Millis, 
Martial S p i r i t , p.~~108, 
3 Nevins, The Evening Post, p. 509; Millis, op. cit., p. 102. 
4New York Daily Tribune, February 17, 1898, pp. 1-6; 
Bradstreet's as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(March 19, 1898), p. 333. 5 New York Daily Tribune, February 3, 1898, p. 4. 6 Wichita Daily Eagle, February 18, 1898, p. 4. 
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claim was made through news agencies that few if any at-
tempted to conceal the pleasure they felt over the explosion 
7 
and consequent destruction. Statements to the same effect 
were made later by American officials before the United Q 
States Board of Inquiry. A western newspaper quoted prom-
inent men who had visited the island as saying that the 
Spaniards no longer were denying that Spain was implicated 
in the ship's destruction.9 
Under such conditions as then existed it was only natu-
ral that the people of the United States generally would lay 
the blame of the ship's destruction to Spanish treachery. 
The first question was, "Was this done by design?"10. Or, 
"How did it happen?"11 At any rate it was deemed impossible 
12 
as an accident. At last negotiations moved rapidly. But 
fast as they moved they were altogether too slow "to placate 
7 Wichita Daily Beacon, March 10, 1898, p. 1; Kansas City 
Star, February 25, 1898, p. 1. 
Q Army and Navy Register as cited in Literary Digest, Vol, 
xvi (April 16, 1898); p. 451. — 
9Wichita Daily Beacon, March 10, 1898, p. 6. 
10 
Kansas City Star, February 16, 1898, p. 6. 
ll 
Literary Digest. Vol. XVI (February 26, 1898), p. 241. 
12 Kansas City Star, February 17, 1898, p. 1. 
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the impatient spirits" who pressed the government for ac-
13 tion, immediate action. Back of this and part of it also, 
was the vigorous activity of the newspapers, particularly 
14 
the more wealthy and aggressive ones. Not only did they 
publish their own findings but as fast as the government 
received dispatches bearing upon the matter these also with 
few exceptions were given to the public through their T C 
columns and all were handled in a variety of ways. w In 
whatever way they were reported and printed the fact re-
mained that each day's news tended to make war seem a little 
nearer. 
John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy, as late as 1903 
said that the mystery of the loss of the Maine "remains yet 
„ 16 
to be solved". This was said notwithstanding the findings 
of two courts of inquiry, the United States and Spanish. 
But so firm was the conviction fixed in the minds of the 
American people that they at once with quite a show of 
13 
Wilson, History of American People, Vol. V, p. 273 
14Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (February 26, 1898), pp. 242-244. 
15 " Topeka Daily Capital, February 22, 1898, p. 4, Philadel-
phia Ledger as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(March 26, 1898), p. 368. 16 Rhodes, McKinley and Roosevelt, p. 48. 
unanimity adopted the motto, "Remember the Maine", while at 
the same time they displayed a determination not to elimi-
nate the Spaniards from the list of those charged with 
17 
complicity in the outrage. 
In an interview with Robert T. Lincoln, Ex-secretary of 
War, that general is reported to have said, "on entering the 
harbor of Havana the Maine did so with full knowledge that 
it was a fortified harbor and took all chances of accident." 
Against this view, however, stood the opinion of Professor 
H. E. von Hoist of Chicago University, authority on Consti-
tutional History and on International Law, that in any case 
Spain was responsible "if it be true that the place of 18 anchorage was assigned to the Maine by Spanish officials". 
But, in the absence of authentic information, the generally 
accepted view of Americans was that the Maine was destroyed 
19 
intentionally. They could not much longer be held back. 
They believed Spain was guilty and they called for war, 
feeling that Spanish treachery must be punished.20 17 •"•'Indianapolis News as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(February 26, 1898), p. 242. 18 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (March 5, 1898), p. 271. 
19Kansas City Times as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(March 12, 1898), p. 302. 
20 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (February 26, 1898), p. 242; 
Richardson, Messages and Papers, Vol. X, p. 603. 
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No stress or excitement had been brought upon the 
people of the United States since the Civil War that com-
pared in force or strength to that which followed the de-
struction of the Maine, the climax of more than two years of 
21 
disturbing international relations. Following this dis-
aster came the reports that Spaniards were in great rejoic-
ing over the destruction of the ship and slaughter of its 
22 crew. Popular indignation then became so intense that the 23 
people were with difficulty held in check. Notwithstand-
ing all this excitement it was a fact often remarked upon 
that the people of the United States were not to be 24 
stampeded even under stress of strong emotion. 
Throughout the century Americans had believed that 
Spain was not really friendly at any time toward the United 
States, hence it was comparatively easy for them to ascribe 
Spanish enmity and perfidy as the moving spirit back of the 25 
destruction of the Maine. The memory of the Virginius 
affair was at that time quite vivid and of course gave color 
to the situation. Yet, in spite of everything, there were 
21 J. H. Wilson, Under the Old Flag, Vol. ll, p. 415; Nevins, 
The Evening Post, p. 508. 22 Chicago Tribune, February 21, 1898, p. 1. 2 3 Standard History of the World, Vol. VIII, p. 4228. 
24 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (February 26, 1896), p. 242. 
2 5 Kansas City Times as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(March 12, 1898)," p. 302. 
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some Who were optimistic enough to publish the belief that 
26 
there was little danger of war between the two nations. 
As a background for this was the testimony of Captain Sigs-
bee himself as to the graciousness shewn by the local 
Spaniards at the funeral of the seamen who perished on the 
07 
Maine. 
A Naval Court of inquiry into the cause of the destruc-
tion of the Maine, appointed by the United States government 
made its report the latter part of March, 1898. Admiral 
William T. Sampson was the chairman, and the Court found 
that the loss of the ship was in no way due to the fault or 
negligence of its officers or crew. In the opinion of the 
court the ship was destroyed, primarily, by a submarine 
mine. This mine explosion in turn caused the explosion of 
two magazines within the ship. The court was not able, 28 
however, to fix the blame upon any person or persons. 
As to the testimony upon which the court's decision 
was based the Army and Navy Register had this to say: "The 
testimony shows four features which should have moved the 
President to a sterner disposition of the incident. One was 
26Wichita Daily Eagle, February 18, 1898, p. 4. 
27 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (February 26, 1898), p. 241. 
28 Ibid., April 9, 1898, p. 421; Congressional Record, 
55 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 31, Part 2, February 17, 
1898, p. 1819; February 18, p. 1871; Ibid., Part 4, 
March 28, 1898, p. 3278. 
the opposition of the Spanish authorities to the visit of 
the Maine; another, the unfriendly reception of the ship; 
three, the circumstances of the mooring position of the 
Maine was an unnatural one; the fourth, the condition of 
the wreck". This statement was given to the world April 16, 
1898, just in time to add its weight to the reasons back of 
the clamor for war. In 1911 another official investigation 
was made. The Maine at this time was raised from the harbor, 
and then it was seen to the satisfaction of the investiga-
tors that the ship had been sunk by an outside explosion, 
not by one on the inside. Thus the view taken by the 
29 
American Court In 1898 was sustained. 
Upon publication of the report of 1898 the American 
people seemed to throw aside all restraint. The demand ror 
war was overwhelming.30 All along the deed had been con-
sidered a grievous thing, but lack of official evidence had 
caused the millions to suspend judgment. Now all cause for 
restraint had been set aside. No American directly impli-
cated had committed a crime, no one was guilty of cowardice. 
The honor or the nation remained unimpaired. Spain must be 
punished. A 
29 Adams, Foreign Policy, Millis, op. cit«, p. 127. 
30 
Latane, America's Foreign Policy, p. 506. 
51New York Daily Tribune, February 21, 1898, p. 6. 
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The loss of the Maine and crew now became the over-
shadowing topic of interest. Already the American people 
were smarting under aspersions cast upon their chief execu-
tive by the interception and publication of a letter written 
by the Spanish Minister to the United States, Dupuy de Lome. 
They were in no mood to suffer passively in the face of a 
32 
great calamity. Yet even then the question was raised and 
went not unheeded, "In what respect would the exaction of 
freedom for Cuba atone to us for our loss?" In other words, 
what would America gain since Cuba free would never repair 
the loss? This loss was considered as above and beyond the 33 
question of Cuba. When the President would be called upon 
to intervene there would be two shocks coming for Spain; 
one, when he would "intervene with force", the other, the 
shock of the demand made because of the loss of the Maine , , 34 and her crew. 
In a prominent newspaper appeared this ; "After all is 
said, the Maine is the chief cause of the war". The 266 
Americans assassinated were worth more than all the Cubans 
32 The Chautauquan, Vol. XXVII (June, 1898), pp. 89-96. 
33 Chicago Times-Herald as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. 
XVI (March 12, 1898), p. 304. " ^ 34 Brooklyn Standard Union as c i t e d in L i te rary Diges t , 
Vol . XVI March 19, 1898) , p. 332. 
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slaughtered. So, too, thought millions of Americans. " In 
the light of added research, however, it must be said that 
the Maine disaster hastened the war, it did not cause the 
36 
war. All the misdeeds of the Spaniards while in control 
of the island, all the stories told or cruelties which she 
practiced upon the Cubans, these simply found their index 37 
in the destruction of the Maine and the death or her crew. 
Because of this catastrophe and the multiplied misdeeds pre-
ceding it, Spain was forced to haul down her flag in the 
western world.3® 
VI THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN OPINION 
The modern newspaper, unquestionably a strong factor 
in public education, is largely a development of the nine-
teenth century. This was the century of the coming of 
railroads, telegraph systems, and of free public education. 
Remote parts were brought closer, and new ideals, broader 
35 Topeka-Daily Capital, April 15, 1898, p. 4; Matheson, 
"United States and (Cuban Independence", loc, cit., p. 825; 
Chicago Tribune, April 12, 1898, p. 12. 
3 6 Denver News as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (March 
12, 1898), p. 302; Literary Digest. Vol'. XVI (April 2, 
1898), p. 391; The Outlook, Vol. XVII (April 23, 1898), 
p. 1004; Millis, op* cit., pp. 107 and 129. 
37 
Kansas City Times, February 16, 1931, p. 1; Millis, 
op. cit., p. 114. •ZQ '"' 
New York Journal as c i t e d in American Press Opinion, 
February 16, 1898, p. 429. 
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= j 
-and richer than those of former days, had begun to govern 
the newspaper world. Manton Marble of the New York World 
maintained that the editor with no high ideals sinks to a 
low level, Pulitzer, his successor, considered the running 
of a newspaper as a "stewardship and trust, solely for the 
public good", and the New York Herald sent Stanley to find 
Livingston. The newspaper was developing a code of ethics.^" 
This expansion of the realms of duty and business called 
into action the correspondent or reporter. The Cuban 
trouble and the war with Spain caused him to be recognized 
as a world factor, a prime necessity. In this crisis he 
reached his highest degree of development unless we except 
the World War period. The telegraph and the reporter made 
a combination that was one of the marvels of the century. 
The immediate effect of this combination was observed in the 
increased size of headlines and in extra editions. A few 
words, often colored, would cover a large part of a page, 
and as reports came in by telegraph new editions would go 
2 
out and the newsboy became busy. 
In order to keep up interest and compete with rivals 
many correspondents grossly exaggerated conditions or situ-
"^Lee, History of American Journalism, pp, 554 and 388; 
Kansas City Star, February 26, 1951, p. D; March 4, 1931, 
p. E. 
2Lee, op. cit., pp. 364-367; Millis, Martial Spirit, p. 41. 
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ations in their reports, or even did much invention.3 Thus 
what was known as the "New Journalism" had gained a mighty 
influence in world affairs. On both sides of the Atlantic 
it flourished, and even the conservative papers increased 
4 
the size of their headings. 
As early as 1895 many newspapers had already taken up 
the cause of the Cubans and were even then demanding that 
the United States recognize them as belligerents.0 That 
Cuba had far more cause for rebellion than America had in 
1776 was proclaimed.6 News of increasing atrocities 
reached the public through the press, and demands stronger 
than ever were made upon the government calling for vigor-
ous action. By 1898 the American newspaper was becoming 7 
recognized as an active public institution. 
As the revolt against Spain continued and uncivilized 
deeds were committed by both sides, the news reached 
3Nevins, The Evening Post, pp. 508-510. 
4Paxson, Recent History of United States, p. 233; Topeka 
Daily Capital, April 2, 1898, p. 1; Wichita Dally Beacon, 
January 12, 13, 14, 1898. 
5 Literary Digest, Vol. XI (September 14, 1895), p. 575. g 
Philadelphia Press as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XI 
(July 27, 1895), p. 362. 7 White, Masks in a Pageant, p. 176; Public Opinion, 
Vol. XXlV (February 24, 1898), p. 229. 
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America almost daily and touched the chords of human sym-
Q 
pathy. Their inherent antipathy for anything Iberian was 
vastly enlarged and their sympathy for the Cubans was in-
creased accordingly. The stories of suffering resulting 
from Weyler's policy were almost beyond belief as exploited 
by the sensational press, yet how eagerly r e a d . 9 
Generally the papers of America at this time could be 
classed as conservative, or, at least not overly given to 
exaggeration in their reports of events coming from Cuban 
sources. Most of them, however, favored intervention if it 
proved the only way to settle the trouble while the minor-
ity were opposed, believing it possible to arbitrate suc-
cessfully. If not, then they favored keeping out of the 
Cuban situation. In this group wa3 found what was known 
in the last half of the nineteenth century as the German-
American press. By the year 1890 these papers had become 
comparatively numerous, and as a rule they enjoyed good 
circulations. They were almost a unit in their opposition 
especially to armed intervention. The only important one 
among them favoring forcible intervention was the Morgen, 10 
controlled by Hearst. 
8 
Rhodes, McKinley and Roosevelt, p. 55; Millis, op. cit., 
p. 27. g Olcott, Life of McKinley, p. 394; Millis, op. cit., p. 27. 




Among those papers that were typically conservative 
yet not opposing intervention by force of arms when nego-
tiation failed, was the Kansas City Star, owned and pub-
lished by William Rockhill Nelson. A review of the issues 
of The Star in 1897-1898 impresses the reader with the fair-
ness of the news and editorials, and shows headings not 
vastly different from those observed in the issues of fif-
teen and twenty years later. They were strong but modest 
in all respects.^ Nelson was a picturesque figure among 
newspaper men, was aggressive but strictly fair and honest. 
He said of himself, "I've tried to be gentle and diplomatic, 
p 
but I've never done well in my stocking feet". It was 
such papers as The Star that really carried decision into 
the homes of America's reading millions. 
After the close of the presidential campaign of 1896 
the Cuban situation attracted more attention in the United 
States than any other. Many tales of adventure by America's 
young men made interesting reading and added zest to the 
situation. ° Following the Maine disaster the situation 
was still further intensified, and "Remember the Maine" be-
gan to appear in increased size of headings. The yellow 
1:iThe Kansas City Star, February 16,17,18, 1898, p. 1 each. 12 Lee, op. cit., p. 376. 
13 — — — — Hawthorne, The United States, p. 1066; Topeka Daily 
Capital, April 15, 1898, p. 4. 
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press even enlarged upon the size of theirs. Correspond-
ents hastened to Havana, many papers chartering boats to 
ply between Key West and that city. For several days extra 
14 
editions were printed. 
The larger newspapers made special effort to throw 
light upon the discovery of the cause of the Maine disaster, 
for such it was generally considered, and one well known 
publication offered a large reward for information leading 15 
to the detection of the guilty party. Excitement was in-
tense, but even under those circumstances the greater part 
of the press was fairly conservative as to news published, 
and in editorials they advised caution on the part of their l fi 
readers and patient waiting for proper findings.xo But when 
Senator Proctor's statement was read by him before the 
United States Senate and then published throughout the land 
the incident served greatly to revive and intensify the 
feeling engendered by former reports concerning the situa-
tion on the unfortunate island. Sympathy in America now 17 
overflowed for the Cuban people. 
14 Lee, op. cit., pp. 565-367. 
15Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (February 26, 1898), p. 241; 
Millis, op. cit., pp. 110-111. 
16Wichita Daily Eagle, February 23, 1898, p. 1; Topeka 
Dally Capital, April 15, 1898, p. 4. 
17Standard History of the World, Vol. Vill, p. 4228; Out-
look, Vol.LVIII (1599), p. 759; Literary Digest, 
Vol. XVI (March 26, 1898), p. 361. 
At Just about the time the American demand for inter-
vention had become most imperative Pope Leo XIII offered 
his services as mediator between the United States and 
Spain. Protestant papers as a rule made strong objection 
to acceptance of this offer. Many of these papers felt 
that he long ago should have offered his mediation between 
Spain and Cuba. A few, however, expressed the belief that 
he had a right to make the offer Just as he did make it. 
Opposition to Papal mediation generally was based upon 
recognition of "temporal sovereignty", and was strongly 
stated.^ 
During April 19-24 Spain and the United States defi-
nitely accepted the status of war. This meant, in the final 
outcome, that Spain was to give up her last vestige of claim 
to America. American newspapers were not slow to place the 
news of the situation as well as their optimistic predic-
tions before their readers from modest headlines to out-
landish sized "caps": the freedom of Cuba was a foregone 
conclusion, and the war of liberation which followed was 
19 
just and honorable. 
18 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (April 30, 1898), pp. 531 and 558 19 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (May 21, 1898), p. 623; Kansas 
City Star, April 2, 1898, p. 2; Topeka Daily Capital; 
April 2, 1898, p. 4; Ibid, April 20, 1898, p. 4. 
In 1895 William Randolph Hearst had got control of the 
New York Journal. Hearst had developed a rabid variety of 
journalism, one of extremes. Sentimentality and exaggera-
tion were the keys which opened the doors to thousands of 
readers, and his papers did not stop at real forms of du-
plicity whenever they deemed such to be necessary in order 
20 
to secure the effect desired. Like his great rival, 
Pulitzer, he realized that it was news and not editorials 
that sold papers.2- A Californian, trained in the San 
Francisco Examiner, he did not hesitate to show his contempt 
for things eastern, however time may have mollified him 
since the Spanish War. He held the western man's aversion 
to customs and politics of Europe. Untrammelled journalism 
as well as unlimited personal liberty found in him one of 
its strongest advocates. Even to the present day he scores 
without mercy any national or international deals of a 22 
shady nature. Yet he claimed that he never advocated re-
forms outside of the law or the provisions of the constitu-
20 Paxson, op. cit., p. 235; Fortnightly Review, Vol. 
LXXXVIIl7~P."~3T9; Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (February 19, 
1898), pp. 211-212; New York Journal as cited in Literary 
Digest, Vol. XVI (March 26, 1898), p. 367; Millis, op. 
cit., p. 67. 21 
William Allen White in Kansas City Star, March 4, 1931, 
r>. E; George H. Payne, History of Journalism In the 
United States (New York, 1920), p. 307. 
22 Kansas City Times, September 3, 1930, p. 1; W. R. Hearst 




After the destruction of the Maine the yellow press 
flared up more luridly than ever, and the New York Journal 
"knew immediately" that the vessel was blown up by a Spanish 
mine. Secretary John D. Long came in for bitter castiga-
tion, particularly from the Hearst organs, when, in an in-
terview he had intimated that the element of Spanish respon-
sibility had been eliminated from the incident of the de-
struction of the Maine. The Journal saw in this the success 
of Spain's perfidy, the perpetration of one great crime done 
in secret to overshadow the evidence of another still more 
open and notorious. "The appalling truth about Cuba was 
about to be made officially known the very day the Maine 
was blown up". The Journal was for Cuban independence at 
24 
once. 
On one occasion Edwin L. Godkin of the Evening Post 
wrote: "A yellow journal office is probably the nearest 
approach, in atmosphere, to hell, existing in any Christian 
state". His chief indignation he poured out on the war 
press, especially the World and the Journal, two papers 
noted in particular for their illustrations, photographs 
23 Payne, op. cit., p. 372; Millis, op. cit^, p. 68. 
24 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (March 12, 1898), p. 302; 
New York Journal as cited in Literary Digest, Vol. XVI 
(February 26, 1898), p. 243. 
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and cartoons. Their sales on the streets were enormous. 
Later on, when victory had crowned America's efforts, the 
Post expressed Itself to the effect that the whole war had 
been due to the active combination of the American sensa-
tional press with an equally unscrupulous majority in con-
25 
gress and "a weak executive in the White House". That 
public sentiment had been greatly Influenced by the sensa-
tional press at the time of the Cuban uprising is substan-
tiated by history, although that it was unduly influenced is 26 
denied by many Americans of note. 
The Literary Digest was an able medium for news distri-
bution, much read and commented on, even by the time of the 
Cuban rebellion of 1895. Its comments were accepted as 
truly representative of that publication's own views on the 
great question of the proper move for the United States at 
this juncture. Not only were there comprehensive extracts 
from a multitude of exchanges republished in the Digest but 
its own editorials were a regular accompaniment to these. 
The situation was reviewed from many angles and comments 
were freely offered. The Digest kept in close touch on the 
Cuban Situation with the leading publications and statesmen 
2=1 
Payne, op. cit., p. 307; Paxson, op. cit., p. 253; Nevins, 
op._ cit., pp. 511, 515; Millis, op. cit. 7 pp. 29 and 38. 26 The Nation, February 24, 1898, p. 139; Rhodes, McKinley 
and Roosevelt, po. 5-9; Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (May 21, 
1898), p. 623. 
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of the world from the beginning of the rebellion in 1895 on 
down through the years that intervened between that time and 
the final settlement with Spain. In view of these facts one 
can see readily that this publication played a great part in 
shaping public sentiment in America during the closing days 
of the nineteenth century. 
In February 1898 this publication gave a special write-
up and an editorial on the Maine disaster. In this issue is 
quoted the dispatch of Captain Sigsbee followed by this com-
ment, that, three days after the disaster the Navy Depart-
ment made a report which showed that the Maine lost 246 men 
and 2 officers, 7 not being accounted for. Then, "The first 
question on the lips of everybody In this country was, how 
did it happen? Definite answer is wanting .... a more 
startling occurrence could scarcely be conceived in view of 
27 
the state of feeling between the United States and Spain", 
later its readers were informed that newspaper discussions 
of the relations between the United States and Spain 
"covers a multitude of phases ..... In the absence of of-
ficial declaration, absolutely conflicting reports regarding 
the plans of the administration find their way into the 
public print".28 And readers were told that a Madrid paper 
27 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (February 26, 1898), p. 241. 
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still had hopes that McKinley and Sagasta might yet be able 
to hold their own "against the yellow American and Red 
„ 29 
Spanish press and the jingoes or both nations • Like all 
reliable news agencies of the time, The Literary Digest was 
greatly interested in Senator Proctor's statement on the 
situation in Cuba and gave it a large amount of space. His 
statement "made conviction general that the situation is 
„ 30 intolerable". 
Two Interesting excerpts from the Digest follow; "News-
paper discussion on the relations or the United States and 
Spain covers a multitude of phases". "A large portion of 
the press of the country takes the position that circum-
stances place upon Spain the burden of proving herself inno-
cent of complicity or lack of diligence". Added to these 
should be one already used, "in the absence or official 
declarations absolutely conflicting reports regarding the 
plans of the administration find their way into public 
prints".51 In these three sentences we have the situation 
that confronted thinking, feeling Americans at that trying 
time in American history. The only wonder is that they were 
so nearly a unit in their conclusions and expressions of 
29 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (April 9, 1898), p. 442. 
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sympathy as they were. The evident fairness of the Literary 
Digest at the time of this crisis in American history was 
both admirable and praiseworthy. 
Thus the American newspaper and kindred avenues of 
news dissemination with a varied leadership and acknowledged 
prestige played their parts in the cumulation of events 
32 
that led to the Spanish-American War. As individual pub-
lications they seemed to travel different pathways, yet the 
journey's end was the same, liberation of Cuba from Spanish 
misrule. Extremists like The Journal and the Post as well 
as those of the Digest type were all striving toward the 
same end, peace on the island of Cuba. 
At the same time those forces were favoring interven-
tion in Cuban affairs others were operating and shaping 
public opinion in another direction. While the larger por-
tion of the press was trying to weigh carefully all matters 
involved, there were many papers and other forces absolutely 
opposed to intervention, and all these had their followers. 
Por instance, the German-American press as a rule were op-
posed, and this opposition was based largely on the premises, 
that, from commercial and business view points, intervention 
would prove a loss, because whatever the form it might take 
to begin with, the final result would be war. Therefore, 
intervention would not only prove to be a loss, but also 
32 
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must be a failure from a humanitarian viewpoint in that 
33 
Americans instead of Cubans must be the sufferers. . The 
Cincinnati Volksblaat, as early as 1896 claimed that war 
with Spain would be simply a war or bruitality, and it held 
to this view till the war was ended. Near the close of 
1897 the Chicago Rundschau complained that although our 
finances were disorganized and our coast defenseless, still 34 
we were going into a war unjust on our part. A few months 
later the New York Volksblaat insisted that it would be dif-
ficult to find a just cause to interfere in Cuba. Another 
at the time of the declaration of war said, "War swallows 
up gold in great quantities". Still another claimed both 
friends and enemies on each side, workingmen in particular, 
and for this reason protested against entering into war with 35 
Spain. These papers represented a class of useful citi-
zens and their views undoubtedly had great weight in several 
centers of population in the United States. 
In this connection comments by certain foreign papers 
copied and widely published In America, are of interest for 
the reason that they undoubtedly had some influence upon the 
thousands who read clippings from them, and these readers 
33 Literary Digest, Vol. XVI (April 16, 1898), p. 452. 
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were among the thinking men and women of the land. Prom 
the Journal des Debats, Paris, we got this: "Nobody in the 
United States realizes what enormous sacrifices are needed 
to bring to its knees a nation as stubborn as the Spaniards, 
and nobody seems to see that this intervention has not a 
3 6 
shadow of justice about it". The Saturday Review of 
London was not quite sure that the southern states would 
remain loyal to the union if they were subjected to Spanish 
Invasion. Its neighbor. The Scotsman, saw a coast line un-
protected and much merchant traffic harassed. From our 
neighbor south of the Rio Grande we read this, "The conduct 
of the United States In the Cuban question Is most hypo-
critical". That paper, the Telesfero sees in Spain an 38 
enemy hard to defeat. The Heraldo of Spain claimed that 
the United States is like an upstart who thinks he can do as 
he pleases because he has a few dollars. The Hamburger 
Nachrichten told its readers that "this is the first time a 
transoceanic power boldly arises against a member of the 39 
European society of states". As a very general rule 
foreign papers opposed intervention by America In Spanish-
Cuban affairs. 
56Llterary Digest, Vol. XVI (March 19, 1898), p. 332. 
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Other forces were at work in 1895-1898 shaping American 
opinion and sentiment. Those Americans who had financial 
interests being destroyed by the rebellion called loudly for 
intervention, naturally so, but the great financial inter-
ests were opposed to any intervention by means of force, 
the reason most prominent being that the United States was 
by 1897 rapidly recovering from the effects of the panic of 
1893, and new enterprises were being inaugurated upon the 
40 
basis of peace. The influence of this force in diplo-
matic affairs was so readily recognized that opponents of 
intervention often were taunted with being under the influ-
ence of Wall Street.41 
Foremost among prominent Americans who were not in 
favor of Intervention by force was President Cleveland. 
Cleveland as an active, open minded executive had obtained 
a view of world affairs superior, possibly to that of most 
Americans of his day.42 But Cleveland was the head of an 
isolated republic and his solution of the problem of the 43 island was purchase. Even after the sinking of the Maine 
40 White, Masks In a Pageant, p. 177; The Chautauquan, Vol. 
XXVII (June, 1 8 9 8 ) , p. 5 1 8 ; Wichita Daily Eagle, March 16, 
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he did not alter his belief that it would be unjust to de-
clare war, and after war was declared he said that America 
would some day seek for a justification but would not find 
44 
one. 
Cleveland not only was bound by the traditions of his 
country in political foreign relations, but he dreaded 
war's possible effect upon business recovery and expansion. 
His successor, McKinley, was anxious to see "the wheels be-
gin to turn" and to continue to turn. As in the case of 
Cleveland he was constantly importuned to throw the nation 45 
into the Cuban struggle. When he seemed to give ear to 
this then the world of business became alarmed and entered 
strong protests. But after all McKinley was sparring for 
peace. At the same time he earnestly desired to act ac-
cording to the wishes of the masses. He saw the impossi-
bility of a peaceable settlement and almost abruptly began 
to prepare for war. 
"Left alone, McKinley probably would have avoided a 
war as he — had imagination enough to count the frightful 
44 
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cost of war as few of his associates did. Congress never-
theless was bent on war and the populace clamored for war. 
The will of the masses overbore the judgment of the Presi-
dent and had its way. War came. The whole thing presents 
fascinatingly interesting evidence of the popular control 
of foreign policy. Is it a good thing? Prom the depths of 
lethargy about their foreign policy and from an appalling 
abyss of ignorance on the subject, the American people sud-
denly determined to shape their own destinies in inter-
national relations. 
VII PUBLIC OPINION AS A CAUSE OF THE 
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR: SUMMARY OF INFLUENCES 
A careful study of United States history reveals this 
Important fact* generally some phase of Cuban activity has 
been an issue in American politics and international diplo-
macy since colonial time. English, French and Americans 
have been attracted to the island by its strategic position, 
by its products, and by its position as a Spanish colony. 
When the former continental possessions of Spain had been 
recognized by the leading nations as free states, the Cubans 
began not only to display a semblance of intelligent 
47 
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interest in their own possibilities but also to ask relief 
from the mother country. 
In 1868 they rebelled and a costly war of ten years 
was fought. Cuba was temporarily pacified by promises of 
better treatment from the Spanish government. Americans 
then resumed operations and began making Investments in 
this island. But Spanish promises did not materialize. In 
addition to this drawback the United States by the Tariff 
of 1894 practically put Cuban sugar interests Into bank-
ruptcy. In 1895 the Cubans, not knowing which way to turn 
for relier, again rose In rebellion against Spain. In this 
uprising General Maximo Gomez inaugurated the cruelties 
which disgraced the pages of history, dark and bloody as 
were many of them already. In an effort to suppress the 
Insurrection General Victonano Weyler employed even more 
cruel methods. The wrath of millions in America was then 
aroused and diplomacy was tried and called upon to make 
speed. But International etiquette prevailed, and conse-
quent postponement of action became decidedly odious. So 
the war dragged on, and then economic interests became a 
great factor in negotiations. Some lines of business called 
for intervention while others opposed. Thus in 1898 those 
Interested in commerce and in property in Cuba, and those 
who held stocks and bonds depending upon Cuban economic 
77 
conditions all called for intervention, even by force of 
arms. On the other hand was stable business, now rapidly 
expanding and gaining the confidence of the people, utterly 
opposed to intervention in any form which promised trouble. 
Contemporary to these were other forces operating with 
which the former group could work to advantage. 
One of these forces was love of freedom, liberty and 
equality among men. Freedom for Cuba was fast becoming an 
object worthy of American thought and action. So long had 
the people of the United States enjoyed this condition that 
they were possessed by a strong desire to see all other 
people in the enjoyment of its blessings. 
At this stage in the Cuban trouble came the destruc-
tion of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor and the death 
of 266 of her crew. Millions of Americans assigned Spanish 
treachery as the cause. But the loss of the Maine and 
destruction of her crew was not the cause of this outburst 
of feeling against Spain. Rather was it that this disaster 
furnished a vivid, a telling example denoting a deplorable 
state of affairs under which Spanish incompetency was 
operating. 
The fear of acting too much upon impulse at a critical 
period in American history was not the strong reason for 
whatever hesitancy there had been among the people of the 
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United States in taking forcible possession of Cuba. Ameri-
cans are a peace loving people. Till hope of settlement by 
diplomatic measures had fled, peace was the desire strongest 
in their hearts. Spain pursued her usual dilatory methods 
of attending to her foreign affairs, even in so serious a 
matter as the sinking of the United States battleship in the 
harbor of her island possession. She banked too much on 
America's love of peace. Stable business took advantage of 
this sentiment at home and action was delayed by writing up 
and talking up the many serious situations possible and 
probably should America intervene by armed force. The "Big 
Business" interests, the ultra conservative press of the 
country, and the conscientiously opposed portion of the 
nation represented an effective combination because, in a 
land of peace loving people, the arguments of these forces 
all very naturally had an immediate appeal to true Americans. 
But back of all these forces making for peace or for 
war was another whose impact was irresistible, the force 
which made the war inevitable. Along the northern shores 
of the Gulf of Mexico two civilizations with few things in 
common, in many ways antagonistic, had met and halted -- for 
a brief period. Added to this was a world fast becoming one 
great commonwealth, and one has the situation involving 
Cuba in 1898. The original and fundamental reason for that 
display of sympathy willing to give its blood and treasure 
79 
that Cuba might be free was this deep-seated difference in 
civilizations. 
Now, why did America intervene in Cuban affairs and 
precipitate the Spanish-American War? Not wholly to re-
lieve the starving Cubans from the curse of their miseries* 
not largely even for the sake of investments in Cuba; not 
because certain national and world forces opposed interven-
tion, or advocated it, as the case might have been; not be-
cause of passion or revenge; not alone because of the Maine 
disaster; not because newspapers printed their frightful 
stories under large headlines. Primarily it was because of 
fundamental differences in social, industrial, political, 
religious ideals — in civilization itself. To this may be 
added the more evident reasons: Many Americans held in-
vestments in Cuban property, many held Cuban provisional 
government bonds, many were engaged in commerce with the 
island. This class of allied interests suffered fright-
fully and called for help. Opposed to these financial de-
mands were the demands of stable business for uninterrupted 
peace in order to insure complete return to normal condi-
tions, and the proverbial longing of Americans to live in 
peace. 
But commercial and financial reasons alone were of 
minor importance. America was impelled to throw herself 
80 
into the fray because Cuba was suffering under the rule of 
a despotism; because of atrocities committed upon a help-
less people near their own shores; because almost upon the 
threshold of the continent where freedom had won its great-
est victories a people were calling for relief from tyranny; 
because the great American newspaper and the traveller and 
the investigator had told and retold the story of Cuba and 
the cause of her woes. The fundamental impulse was the 
sympathy of the people. The vast majority of Americans had 
weighed and balanced the evidence, and they offered their 
services freely toward putting an end to Spain's rule in 
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